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*I.C.C.L.R. 151  Introduction  
The Trustee Act 2000, which received Royal Assent last year, came into force on February 
1, 2001. The Act makes fundamental changes in the manner in which trustees can and are 
expected to administer property subject to a trust. The Trustee Bill 2000, which led to the 
enactment of the Trustee Act 2000, was introduced into the House of Lords in January 2000 
and implemented the proposals and recommendations of the Law Commission set out in 
their 1999 Report entitled “Trustees Powers and Duties”.1 The Act is divided into six parts 
and consists of 43 sections and four schedules. The main thrust of the legislation focuses 
on five areas of trust law which were thought to be unsatisfactory for the purposes of 
administering modern trusts. These five areas are (1) the duty of care imposed upon 
trustees; (2) the power of investment conferred upon trustees; (3) the power to appoint 
nominees and agents; (4) the power to acquire land; and (5) the power to receive 
remuneration for work done as a trustee. This article explores the background to the Act, 
which no doubt must be the single most important statutory intervention in the 
administration of trusts since the Trustee Act 1925. It also examines why and how the new 
law has been implemented. The Trustee Act 2000 is an important piece of legislation for 
commercial lawyers as well as providers of financial services. The main provisions of this 
new legislation reflect the importance of the trust in commercial matters. 
 The background  
The need for changes in the law relating to the administration of trusts was not something 
of a new phenomenon; indeed, the Trustee Act 2000 had a long history to it. As far back as 
1982 the Law Commission had recommended reform, particularly so in the context of the 
rules relating to the delegation of trustee duties upon other persons.2 Nothing resulted 
from the 1982 Report despite continuing pressures from trust lawyers. Some specific 
changes were brought into force by statutory instrument, most notably in relation to 
investment practice. For example, in 1996 an order was passed which allowed trustees, 
when exercising their powers of investment under the Trustee Investment Act 1961, to 
invest a greater proportion of the trust funds in equities.3 This order was made in 
recognition of the fact that modern trusts required a greater proportion of the funds to be 
invested in equities so as to achieve acceptable increases in the capital of the trust fund. 
Furthermore, investment in equities was no longer to be seen in the same cautious way as 
it was some 100 years ago because of the modern portfolio theory of investment, which 
meant that investment in equities was not necessarily a risky thing to do.4 In June 1997 
the Law Commission published a consultation paper recommending, inter alia, changes in 
the law relating to trustee delegation. The 1999 Law Commission Report5 was arrived at in 
the context of an increasing awareness that the modern trust operates in quite different 
circumstances from those that existed some 150 years ago.6 
There is no doubt that the trust operates in a context far different from that which existed 
at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century. The ability of the trust 
to adapt to social and economic changes stems from the very fact that the trust is an 
immensely flexible concept and one capable of operating in different areas of society to 
achieve different social and economic objectives.7 At the end of the nineteenth century the 
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trust operated primarily in the context of wills and family settlements. The *I.C.C.L.R. 
152  primary function of trustees in such a context was to preserve the trust fund over a 
long period of time for the benefit of beneficiaries entitled in succession. Whilst investment 
of the trust funds was important, the paramount duty was to preserve the trust fund and 
this meant that trustees were generally not allowed to invest in risky investments. In such 
a context investment was not necessarily a complex matter for trustees. Today, whilst the 
trust does have a role to play in wills and in the context of family arrangements, the 
express private trust finds itself operating more and more in a commercial context 
requiring trustees to meet different social and economic objectives. In many modern trusts 
the paramount duty of the trust is not only to preserve the trust fund but also to make sure 
that the fund grows and meets inflationary pressures. In trusts where capital growth is of 
the essence, for example in trusts governing pension and investment funds, the trustees 
duty is to make sure that there is satisfactory growth in the capital value of the fund. 
It is not only the changes in the functions of the modern trust that have resulted in the new 
law, but also changes in investment practices. Trustees who have a duty to invest trust 
funds, particularly so in the context of commercial trusts such as pension fund trusts and 
unit trusts, will inevitably find themselves faced with complex investment practices which 
may require the need for experienced financial experts to not only implement investments 
decisions but also to make those decisions so as to satisfy the duty of the trustees to act in 
the best interest of their beneficiaries.8 Therefore, unlike the trustees of the nineteenth 
and early twentieth century, the modern trustee's duty to invest is an extremely important 
matter requiring knowledge of complex investment matters. The transition of trusteeship 
from the type that existed at the end of the nineteenth century to a more modern one is no 
better explained by one commentator as far back as 1951.9 Shattuck writes: 
“[T]o be sure, a hundred years before the time of Victoria's death trusteeship had passed, 
somewhat nervously, from the concept of safe conduct of a specific res into the concept of 
maintenance of a stated set of values. During that transition the duty of the English trustee 
had transformed itself from the relatively restricted obligations related to care, custody and 
operation of family agricultural real estate and its appurtenances to the more intricate task 
of trading in commercial and financial markets and to the attempted maintenance, through 
the life of the trust, of a value which had been stated to exist at the time of the opening of 
the inventory.”10 
It is in this background that the Trustee Act 2000 finds itself on the statute books. The 
following sections of this Article explore the changes which the Act has introduced 
 The general duty of care  
Part I of the Act introduces a new statutory duty of care applicable to trustees when 
carrying out their functions under the Act, for example investment and appointment of 
agents, nominees and custodians. The general duty extends to trustees carrying out 
similar functions under the trust instrument. The general duty is defined in section 1 and 
basically provides that a trustee must exercise such care and skill as is reasonable in the 
circumstances making allowance for his special knowledge, experience or professional 
status. Schedule 1 of the Act makes provision for this general duty to be excluded in the 
trust instrument. The general duty of care, whilst creating an objective standard of care, 
does have a subjective element to it. Whilst a trustee is expected to behave as a prudent 
businessman, section 1 specifically requires that the experience and skills of the individual 
trustee be considered when applying the duty of care. There are a couple of points to note 
about the general duty of care in section 1 of the Act. 
First, the general duty of care is really an enactment of the rule which had been on many 
occasions explained in the common law. For example, in Speight v. Gaunt Lord Blackburn 
explained that: “as a general rule a trustee sufficiently discharges his duty if he takes in 
managing trust affairs all those precautions which an ordinary prudent man of business 
would take in managing similar affairs of his own.”11 However, what is different is that 
section 1 requires a court to take into consideration the specific skills and experience of the 
individual trustee. The question arises as to whether this subjective element lowers the 
standard of care required of a lay trustee who may not have the knowledge which a 
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reasonable businessman may have. It is doubtful that it does lower the standard of care, all 
that it appears to be saying is that reasonableness must be measured in light of different 
trustees. Of course, it would be absurd to suggest that a professional trustee must be 
expected to exercise the same degree of care and skill as that required of a lay trustee. 
Equally on the other hand, a lay trustee cannot be expected to exercise the same care and 
skill which a *I.C.C.L.R. 153  professional trustee claims to have. However, this does not 
mean that a lay trustee is necessarily subject to a low duty of care; he must exercise such 
care and skill required of a person in a similar situation. In other words, reasonableness 
must now be measured in light of all the circumstances of the trust. 
Secondly, and following on from the first point, the general duty of care makes it absolutely 
clear that a professional trustee owes a higher duty of care than a normal trustee. Prior to 
the Trustee Act 2000 there was no doubt in the minds of many that a professional trustee 
should exercise a higher duty of care than that of a reasonable businessman. However, in 
so far as the case law is concerned, the matter was far from clear and much confusion 
centred on the question as to whether the higher duty of care was required from a paid 
trustee or professional trustee. In one case Harman J. explained that a “paid trustee is 
expected to exercise a higher standard of diligence and knowledge than an unpaid trustee, 
and … a bank which advertises itself largely in the public press as taking charge of 
administrations is under a special duty”.12 Whilst there is no doubt that a professional 
trustee should owe a higher duty of care based on his knowledge, skill and experience13 , 
not all paid trustees are necessarily professional trustees. What Harman J. was envisaging 
was a professional trustee and not just a paid trustee. The general duty of care in section 
1 allows for a higher duty of care to be expected from a professional trustee without 
necessarily a higher duty from a paid trustee who happens to be a lay trustee. Although a 
lay trustee may be paid for his services, the duty of care required of him is to be measured 
in the circumstances of the case making allowance for his special knowledge and 
experience. 
 The power of investment  
Part II of the Trustee Act 2000 creates a new statutory power of investment and in doing so 
repeals the Trustee Investment Act 1961 which had for a long time been regarded as out of 
date with modern investment practices. Although many modern trusts will invariably 
contain wide powers of investment, older trusts tend not to have such express powers, 
neither do trusts created in home drawn wills, and it is here that the statutory power 
becomes important. To understand the basis of the new statutory power of investment 
brief mention must be made to the position before the Trustee Act 2000 came into force. 
Historically, the law of trusts took a very cautious approach to investment of trust funds. 
The primary objective behind the investment of trust funds was to preserve the trust fund 
and generate income. Trustees were not permitted to invest in high-risk investments such 
as equities unless there was some express power in the trust instrument authorising them 
to do so. The most obvious types of investment authorised at the turn of the twentieth 
century were investments in mortgages and government stocks. Such investments hardly 
presented problems in the typical family trust where the duty of the trustees was to 
preserve and protect the trust fund whilst at the same time generating interim income for 
beneficiaries entitled in succession. 
The cautious approach to trustee investment became clearly out of date around the middle 
of the twentieth century. Around this period the trust had become employed for purposes 
rather different from those that existed before. The trust became employed in family as 
well as commercial contexts and for purposes which were not necessarily to preserve the 
trust fund in its simple meaning, but to preserve the fund in line with inflationary pressures. 
The only way in which trust funds can hedge against inflation is if they can be invested in 
equities. The Trustee Investment Act 1961 allowed trustees to invest in equities without 
totally abandoning the policy of safe investments. The 1961 Act restricted trustees to 
authorised investments. The Act divided investments into “narrow range” and “wide range” 
investments. Narrow range investments consisted primarily of fixed-rate investments 
whilst wide range investments consisted of shares in public companies. Trustees could, if 
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they wanted, invest the whole of the trust fund in the narrow range; however, if they 
wanted to invest in the wide range they were required to divide the trust fund into two 
parts. Initially trustees were required to divide the fund equally and make sure that 
one-half was invested in the narrow range allowing the other half to be invested in equities. 
At the time of its repeal, that division had changed so that trustees were only required to 
invest 25 per cent of the trust fund the narrow range allowing up to 75 per cent to be 
invested in the wide range. 
Whilst the Trustee Investment Act 1961 was seen as generous at the time of its enactment, 
it had clearly become out of date with modern investment practices. The manner in which 
financial markets operate and the functions of the modern trust have made it impossible in 
many cases for the ordinary trustee to invest trust funds in the best interests of the 
beneficiaries. In many cases it is far more appropriate for such trustees not to be restricted 
to authorised investments such as those which existed under the Trustee Investment Act 
1961, but rather to delegate the entire process of selecting and implementing investment 
*I.C.C.L.R. 154  decisions to professional persons.14 The requirement to divide the fund 
between the narrow range and the wide range had been criticised as been unduly 
restrictive.15 There is no doubt that investing trust funds in modern financial markets is a 
complex matter for trustees, and whilst it is not intended to examine the complexity in this 
Article, a few points are worth mentioning.16 In the case of trusts which consist of very 
large funds, investment, which can produce substantial growth in the capital, requires the 
employment of nominees to deal with securities. The use of nominees is absolutely 
essential to the investment because it is only through this medium that the investment of 
the trust fund can produce the best results. Nominees are not only in the best position to 
determine the adequacy of a particular portfolio of investment but they can also manage 
the fund, provide paperwork for the Inland Revenue and facilitate the electronic transfer of 
and settlement in securities. 
The new statutory power of investment is now to be found in section 3(1) of the Trustee Act 
2000. Section 3(1) confers upon trustees an extremely wide power of investment; basically 
it gives the trustees the same power of investment as that held by an absolute owner of 
property. The section provides that: “… a trustee may make any kind of investment that he 
could make if he were absolutely entitled to the assets of the trust”. The trustee must of 
course comply with the general duty of care in section 1 of the Act, which provides a 
safeguard for the beneficiaries. This new power of investment must be examined in light of 
the new powers of delegation. Unlike before, trustees will be able to delegate their 
discretion as well as their duty to invest. Like the Trustee Investment Act 1961, this new 
power is a “default provision” and will only apply in so far as there is no contrary provision 
in the trust instrument. Furthermore, the new statutory power contained in Part II does not 
apply to occupational pensions schemes, authorised unit trusts and schemes under the 
Charities Act 1993.17 The new power is retrospective in nature; section 7(1) provides that 
Part II of the Act applies to trusts created before the commencement of the Act. Whilst the 
statutory power is contained in section 3(1), section 4(1) of the Act requires trustees to 
have regard to “standard investment criteria” when investing. Section 4(3) defines 
“standard investment criteria” to mean suitability to the trust of the investment and the 
need for diversification in so far as it is appropriate in the circumstances. This investment 
criteria is not entirely new, similar provisions were found in section 6(1) of the Trustee 
Investment Act 1961. The standard investment criteria are important because the 
functions of trust investment vary from one type of trust to another. Section 4(2) requires 
the trustee to periodically review the trust investments with regard to the standard 
investment criteria. This duty to review is an enactment of the position exemplified in the 
common law.18 
Trustees are required by section 5 to obtain advice before investing unless the 
circumstances conclude that it is unnecessary or inappropriate to do so. Obviously putting 
the trust funds in an ordinary current account pending further investment decisions may 
not require advice, but a decision to invest in securities will invariably require advice. 
Section 5(4) defines proper advice to mean: “advice of a person who is reasonably believed 
by the trustee to be qualified to give it by his ability in and practical experience of financial 
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and other matters relating to the proposed investment”. The full impact of this new 
statutory power of investment must be seen in conjunction with the new power of 
delegation, which is examined later on. Collectively these powers allow trust investments 
to be managed by professional persons for the best interests of the beneficiaries whilst at 
the same time protecting trustees from liability for improper management of trusts assets 
in the interests of their beneficiaries. 
 Acquisition of land  
Until the Trustee Act 2000 came into force, trustees had no general power to purchase land 
as an investment. There were only two exceptions to this. First, where the trust instrument 
authorised the trustees to purchase land as an investment, they could do so for the 
purpose of generating income.19 Secondly, where the trustees were trustees of land 
*I.C.C.L.R. 155  and so governed by the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 
1996. Section 6 of the 1996 Act confers upon trustees of land a power to purchase land as 
an investment, for occupation by the beneficiary or for any other reason. The net effect of 
the absence of a general power to purchase land was that trustees of pure personalty had 
no power to acquire land for the rent-free occupation of their beneficiaries. However, 
trustees who held personalty as well as land on trust for their beneficiaries could give 
rent-free occupation to their beneficiaries by virtue of the 1996 Act. This produced an 
unsatisfactory result since, if by chance the subject-matter of a trust consisted of 
personalty as well as realty, trustees could invest in land and give rent-free occupation. On 
the other hand, personal property subject to a trust could not be converted into real 
property for the rent-free occupation of the beneficiaries. 
Under the new legislation trustees can now purchase land in the United Kingdom. Part III 
of the Trustee Act 2000 gives the trustees a power to purchase the land as an investment, 
for occupation by the beneficiaries or for any other reason.20 This new power is based 
upon that which is contained in the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996. 
Once trustees have acquired land they will be vested with the same powers as an absolute 
owner of land. Trustees will be able to sell, lease and mortgage the land. The new power to 
purchase land is a default provision, which means that it can be excluded subject to a 
contrary provision in the trust instrument.21 Moreover, the new power is retrospective so 
applies to trusts created before the commencement of the Act.22 
 The power of delegation and liability for the acts of agents  
Part IV of the Trustee Act 2000 deals with the appointment of agents, nominees and 
custodians and the liability of the trustees for such persons. This area of the law of trusts 
had become the subject-matter of immense criticism. It is not intended here to examine 
the nature of that criticism in detail simply because such an exercise has been carried out 
on many occasions in the various literature on the law of trusts. Indeed most students and 
practitioners of the law of trust will be familiar with the criticisms of the law of delegation 
under the Trustee Act 1925. However, a few obvious points about the delegation rules 
before the commencement of the new legislation can be made in order to put the new rules 
into context. 
First, although it had become clear in the nineteenth century, and perhaps even before 
then, that trustees could in certain circumstances delegate their functions to another, 
trustee could not, however, delegate their administrative or dispositive powers to another 
person. The Law Commission recognised that this presented a serious problem in the 
administration of modern trusts.23 In particular, the fact that the office of trusteeship had 
become so specialised that it might be impossible for trustees to exercise certain 
administrative discretions properly for the beneficiaries. The most obvious example here is 
the exercise of power of investment in a complex financial market. 
Secondly, there was the problem with the statutory power of delegation contained in the 
Trustee Act 1925 and the rules relating to the liability of the trustees for the acts of the 
agent employed under that power. Section 23 of the Trustee Act 1925 allowed for the 
appointment of an agent by a trustee providing such appointment was made in good faith. 
Section 23 read that a trustee who appointed an agent in good faith was not liable for the 
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default of the agent employed. Section 30 of the same Act; however, read that a trustee 
could be liable for the acts of the agent employed if the trustee was guilty of “wilful 
default”. Not only was there inconsistency with the two sections but also the net effect of 
the sections was to put a very low standard of care on trustees in respect to the 
appointment of agents and their subsequent supervision. The sections excluded a 
negligence based liability and restricted it to conscious wrongdoing or recklessness in the 
sense of not caring whether the trustee's acts amounted to a breach of duty or not. In the 
much criticised decision in Re Vickery24 Maugham J.'s judgment left no room for doubt that 
a trustee may escape liability for the appointment of an agent if he acted in good faith, 
which meant satisfying a subjective test of honesty rather than reasonableness. Moreover, 
a trustee who was not guilty of conscious wrongdoing or recklessness, albeit negligent, 
could however escape liability for the defaults of the agent. This state of affairs was clearly 
unsatisfactory and out of kilter with the onerous and objective duties of reasonableness 
imposed on trustees. 
Finally, there was the problem of appointing nominees and custodians. Until the new 
legislation it was trite law that a trustee was under a duty to safeguard the trust 
property.25 Furthermore, where trust property was vested in the two or more trustees it 
could only be transferred with the consent of all of them. These rules meant that it was 
almost impossible to appoint nominees and *I.C.C.L.R. 156  custodians without 
committing a breach of trust. The appointment of nominees and custodians is however an 
increasingly important mechanism employed in investment practices. As noted above in 
relation to the discussion on investment, the use of nominees provides a very important 
method in which securities are traded in on the financial markets. Nominees in an 
increasing number of cases provide the means by which investors can trade in securities 
through paperless transactions. To get the best investment returns it is in the interests of 
the trust to appoint nominees to facilitate effective trade in securities. 
Sections 11 to 20 of the Trustee Act 2000 deal with the appointment of agents, nominees 
and custodians. Sections 21 to 23 deal with the review of the agents, nominees and 
custodians acts and the question of liability for the acts of such persons employed. These 
sections can be briefly examined. First, in so far as collective delegation, section 11(1) 
provides that trustees of a trust “may authorise any person to exercise any or all of their 
delegable functions as their agent”. Section 11(2) defines delegable functions to consist of 
any function other than four exceptions. These exception are (a) dispositive function, in 
other words, function relating to the distribution of trust assets; (b) a power to allocate fees 
or other payments to capital or income; (c) power to appoint a trustee; and (d) a power 
conferred by law of the trust instrument which allows a trustee to delegate their functions 
or appoint a nominee or custodian. It is apparent from section 11(1) that a trustee may 
delegate his or her administrative functions to another person. 
Where an administrative function is delegated to another, section 15 requires special 
conditions to be satisfied. For example, where a trustee delegates his or her function of 
selecting investments or the sale of trust property, section 15(1) requires that the terms of 
the agreement must be made in writing or at least evidenced in writing. This agreement, 
known as the “policy statement” must give guidance as to how the functions should be 
exercised and should seek an undertaking from the agent that such agent will secure 
compliance with the policy statement. In a typical example, where there is a trust for 
beneficiaries entitled in succession, the policy statement may refer to the standard 
investment criteria contained in Part II of the Act as well as requiring the investment to 
provide a balance between income and capital growth for the life tenant and the 
remainderaman. 
Sections 21 to 23 of the new legislation provide for the review by trustees of the 
appointments of agents, nominees and custodians and also the liability of the trustees for 
the acts of such persons employed. Collectively these sections repeal sections 23 and 30 of 
the Trustee Act 1925 and in doing so impose objective standards of care on trustees rather 
than subjective standards imposed under the old law. Section 21 of the Act merely 
identifies when sections 22 and 23 of the Act apply. Basically these sections will apply when 
the trustees appoints agents, nominees and custodians under the Act or under similar 
    Page7 
provisions in the trust instrument. Section 22 of the Act imposes upon trustees who 
delegate their functions to agents, nominees and custodians a duty consisting of three 
aspects. First, trustees are required to keep under review the terms of the appointment 
and make sure that the person appointed is suitable for the purposes for which he is 
employed. Therefore, unlike the old law, which allowed a trustee to escape liability of the 
agent who was employed in good faith, the new Act imposes upon trustees an ongoing duty 
to make sure that the appointment is satisfactory at all times. Secondly, trustees are 
required to consider whether to intervene in the appointment if the circumstances make is 
appropriate. Finally, trustees are expected to intervene if the circumstances make it 
appropriate for intervention. In so far as the delegation of administrative functions are 
concerned section 22(2) requires the trustees to consider whether there is any need to 
revise the policy statement, and if so, to do so, and also to make sure that the policy 
statement is being complied with. 
In so far as the liability for the acts of agents, nominees and custodians, section 23 
simplifies the law and imposes a high duty of care on trustees. The idea of wilful default and 
conscious wrongdoing or recklessness disappears and trustees will now be liable for 
negligent conduct both in respect of the initial appointment of the agent, nominee or 
custodian and subsequent supervision. Section 23 provides that a trustee will not be liable 
for the acts of agents, nominees and custodians providing he complies with the general 
duty of care in section 1 of the Act both in respect of the initial appointment of the agent, 
nominee or custodian and when carrying out his duties under section 22 of the Act. This is 
a welcome change in the law and puts an end to a long history of criticism directed to the 
statutory power of delegation in the Trustee Act 1925. The imposition of an objective 
standard of care puts this area of law in kilter with other areas relating to the duties of 
trustees when administering trust assets. 
 Remuneration  
The final important area covered by the new legislation relates to remuneration and in 
particular the construction of professional charging clauses. It is trite law that the office of 
trusteeship *I.C.C.L.R. 157  is gratuitous.26 If a trustee is to receive remuneration he 
must point to some specific entitlement to it either by law or the trust instrument. In most 
modern trusts professional trustees will insert charging clauses in the instrument 
purporting to create the trust. In certain cases statute authorises remuneration for special 
types of trustees, for example, judicial trustees are authorised by section 1(5) of the 
Judicial Trustee Act 1895 to receive remuneration. The court also has an inherent 
jurisdiction to authorise remuneration in circumstances where there is no remuneration 
clause in the trust instrument or where there is a remuneration clause but the trustees 
seek to increase the scale of fees.27 The new legislation deals only with professional 
charging clauses. 
Although commonly inserted into trust instruments, the courts strictly construe 
professional charging clauses. For example, a professional trustee relying upon a charging 
clause could only claim remuneration for his professional services which could not have 
been performed by a lay trustee. A solicitor, therefore, could not claim for work done which 
could have been done by a lay person. One way around this was to draft a charging clause 
in a very wide way so that a professional could charge for other services capable of being 
carried out by a lay trustee. Section 28(2) of the Trustee Act 2000, removes the strict 
construction of charging clauses so that a professional trustee can charge for services 
which could have been provided by a lay trustee. A fundamental change in the law is 
provided by section 29, which implies a professional charging clause in all non-charitable 
trusts that do not make provision for remuneration of professional trustees. Where such a 
professional charging clause is implied a professional trustee, such as a trust corporation, 
solicitor, banker or accountant, will be able to receive reasonable remuneration. In the 
case of professional trustees, such as solicitors, bankers and accountants, they must, 
however, obtain permission in writing from the other trustees before they are entitled to 
remuneration. 
 Conclusions  
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The history of the trust has demonstrated that it is a concept of immense flexibility and one 
that has no real problem in adapting to changes in social and economic conditions in 
society. It finds a home in almost all walks of life and it is this characteristic which continues 
to put the lawmakers under constant pressure to change the principles and doctrines of the 
law of trusts to reflect the different contexts in which it now operates. The provisions of the 
Trustee Act 2000 are a reflection of the fact that the trust is now operating in conditions far 
different from those that existed at the beginning of the twentieth century. Although the 
trust continues to play an important role in the family context, that importance is gradually 
being displaced by a commercial context where the needs of trustees are rather different 
from those of trustees administering family trusts. Furthermore, it is not just the functions 
of the trust that have changed, but practices relating to the management of assets in 
complex financial markets. The new legislation, the case for which has been argued over 
the last 20 years or so, is a welcomed development in the modern law of trusts. 
I.C.C.L.R. 2001, 12(5), 151-157 
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